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WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN ECONOMICS
SAY ABOUT EQUITY?
Daniel A. Farber*

By Louis Kap/ow and Steven
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2002. Pp. xxii, 544. $45.

FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE.

Shavell.

Does economics have anything to teach us about the meaning of
fairness? The leading practitioners of law and economics disagree.
Judge Richard Posner argues that economics is largely irrelevant to
distributive issues.1 Posner maintains that the most useful economic
measure of social welfare is cost-benefit analysis (which he calls
wealth maximization). But, he observes, this economic measure
"ratifies and perfects an essentially arbitrary distribution of wealth."2
Given an ethically acceptable initial assignment of wealth, rules based
on economic efficiency may have some claim to be considered fair.3
On the critical issue of distributional equity, however, Posner appar
ently believes that economics has little to say.
In contrast, Professors Louis Kaplow4 and Steven Shavell5 believe
that economics can teach us nearly everything about equity. In
Fairness Versus Welfare, they argue that there is only one viable
notion of equity: resources should be distributed so as to maximize
overall social welfare. As we will see, the full import of this argument
is ambiguous. On the one hand, Kaplow and Shaven expressly
*
Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and McKnight Presidential Professor of Public
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AND VALUES JN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Aristides Hatzis ed., forthcoming 2003) (article
manuscript on file with author).
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(article manuscript at 18).

3 . Id. (article manuscript at 17) (asserting that almost everyone would agree ex ante to
common law rules based on wealth maximization). For a summary of the objections to Pos
ner's views, see BRIAN B IX, JURISPRUDENCE 1 25-26, 189-91 (2nd ed. 1999). I have previ
ously argued that Posner's claim holds only under certain circumstances, namely, when legal
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concede that multiple ways of calculating social welfare might exist, so
might have to look beyond economics to determine the right one.
On the other hand, much of their argument is implicitly predicated on
a specific social welfare function, and in a footnote they give the ar
gument for adopting this function universally.6 If a unique social wel
fare function is given, economic analysis would completely resolve all
equity issues under their approach.
Thus, although they do not say so explicitly, the book can be read
to endorse a singl� definition of equity based on economic analysis.
This reading would completely eliminate any independent role for
judgments about equity. At the least, however, Kaplow and Shaven
believe that economics can restrict value judgments about equity to a
single, sharply defined place in policy analysis: the choice of an appro
priate social welfare function. Posner, in turn, sees only modest merit
in the Kaplow and Shaven theory of social welfare, except to
the extent that it reduces in practice to his own theory of wealth
maximization.7.
Between Posner on one. side, and Kaplow and Shavell on the
other, there is a fundamental difference in visions of the normative
side of law and economics. In one view, questions of equity fall outside
of the domain of economic analysis; in the other, they may be entirely
subsumed by it. Neither view is entirely satisfactory. Like Posner, I
doubt that questions of equity can be reduced to economics, but like
Kaplow and Shaven, I do think that economics has something useful
to contribute to our understanding of equity.
In this Review, I do not directly defend other definitions of equity
against Kaplow and Shavell's criticisms. Rather, I criticize their
conception of social welfare, which is the basis of their theory.8 My
conclusion is that their version of welfarism is not a viable alternative.
Thus, we are not in a position to reduce all ethical questions (other
than choice of a social welfare function) to welfare economics. At least
for those who believe that "it takes a theory to beat a theory," fairness
norms remain unvanquished.
Wy

6. See infra

text accompanying notes 20-22.

See Posner, supra note l (article manuscript at
Fairness versus Welfare shows, he also seems pleased

7.

19-20). As Posner's book blurb for
at the challenge the book offers to

moral philosophers, his own bete noir.
8. For other critiques of their theories, see Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of So
1 10 YALE L.J. 1 73 (2000); Ward
Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 1 02 COLUM. L. REV. 1992-93 (2002); David A. Hoffman
& Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA.
L. REV. 335 (2002); LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER, A WEAVED UP FOLLY'? PREFERENCE, WELL·
BEING AND MORALITY IN SOCIAL DECISIONS (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper
No. 01-009, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=286772; and Joseph William
Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 03 (2002).
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Briefly, the welfarist program advocated by Kaplow and Shaven
has three fundamental flaws. First, except in the easiest cases where a
decision benefits everyone, welfarism as ·such does not determine the
outcome. Rather, the outcome depends entirely on the specific choice
of a social welfare function. Thus, we need some standards for
choosing the function. But these standards cannot be selected on wel
farist grounds, because we have not yet chosen a social welfare func
tion. As a general matter, non-welfarist fairness norms are needed to
select the social welfare function ("SWF"); and this selection in turn
will drive the ultimate social decision.9
Second, some set of procedures will be needed for society to
decide on distributional norms. These procedures, which amount to a
constitutional framework, must themselves be chosen on nonwelfarist
grounds. Thus, the core of constitutional law is immune to welfarism.
The only way to avoid this argument is to assume that only one valid
SWF exists, so that no procedure for choice is necessary. Kaplow and
Shaven implicitly resolve this dilemma by assuming that the SWF will
be utilitarian - that is, that it merely adds individual utilities.
But choosing a utilitarian SWF exacerbates the third problem with
welfarism, which is the difficulty of defining and measuring utility.
Utilitarianism requires a high degree of interpersonal comparability of
utility. So far, no one has successfully provided a definition of utility
that is morally compelling (so that it is something that society has
good reason to maximize), let alone a definition that provides a practi
cal method for assigning quantitative values to utility levels. At the
very least, we are a long way from being able to use utilitarianism as
a practical method for resolving specific disputes about equity. Thus,
Kaplow and Shavell's version of welfarism does not provide a satisfac
tory methodology for analyzing equity. It is at best premature - and
more likely impossible - to try to reduce all issues of equity to
welfare economics, as they seek to do..
Nevertheless, I will also suggest that Posner somewhat underesti
mates the possible contributions of economics to resolving fairness
issues in law. For example, in the field of tax law, Kaplow and

9. A similar p oint is made in a recent article , Michael B. D orff, Why Welfare l)epends
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002). But D or ff's
treatment is limited to unusual types of s ocial we lfare functi ons, which may n ot even fit
within Kapl ow and Shavell's definiti on. These functi ons are n ot strictly increasing in individ
ual utility, s o that s ome improvements in individual utility are n ot counted at all in deter
mining s ocial welfare. Id. at 879-84. Kaplow and Sha ve n would reject D or ff's anarchistic and
de ont ol ogical functi ons, id. at 883, because these functi ons· cann ot be calculated purely on
the basis of utility data about individuals, but als o require data about the c auses of u tility
changes. (Kapl ow and Shavell do all ow the use of n on-utility informati on about individuals,
but only to ch oose the S ocial Wel fare Functi on ("SWF"), n ot to calculate the value of that
functi on once it has been chosen. See p. 24 n.15.) The anarchistic functi on als o vi olates the
Pareto standard. The argument made in the present Review is much m ore general. In addi
ti on, D or ff d oes n ot consider the implicati ons of his argument for constituti onal rules.
on Fairness: A Reply to Kap/ow and Shave//,
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Shavell's own previous work is part of an impressive body of scholar
ship elucidating the role of equity in taxation. Moreover, if we are
willing to lower our sights a little, and ask about equity in disputes
involving small numbers of individuals rather than about overall
societal fairness, economics may have more to contribute. Economists
and game theorists have devised some intriguing mechanisms for
resolving distributive disputes. Economics cannot tell us precisely how
to define equity, but it can help us to design mechanisms for achieving
our notions of fairness, as well as sometimes helping us refine those
concepts. Economic methodology is about how to go about maximiz
ing some relevant attribute, but the attribute in question does not have
to be efficiency. If what we want is to maximize equity, or some
combination of equity and efficiency, economics can help us do that as
well.
One note about terminology before we begin. Kaplow and Shavell
use "fairness" as a term of art, to mean any value judgment that is not
based on utility information. To avoid confusion, I will use fairness in
their somewhat unusual sense as excluding utility-based standards.
"Equity" will be used in a more encompassing sense to include any
standard for determining the just distribution of resources, whether
or not based purely on utility. Thus, for purposes of this Review,
equity includes determinations about the overall distribution of utility,
as well as including fairness in the Kaplow-and-Shavell sense of
nonutility based equity.
Part I summarizes Kaplow and Shavell's argument against fairness.
Part II turns to the problem of defining a social welfare function, while
Part III probes the concept of individual utility. Finally, Part IV con
siders some uses of economic analysis and game theory in identifying
methods for achieving equity.
I.

WELFARISM, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

Before considering the approach favored by Kaplow and Shaven,
we should review the more conventional approaches taken by
practitioners of law and economics. Posner's view of the relationship
between equity and economic analysis is undoubtedly the conven
tional one among practitioners of law and economics.
The starting point for analysis is the idea of individual utility.
Conventionally, "utility" is used as an arbitrary index for what is really
an ordinal ranking of individual preferences; all that matters is the
relative ranking rather than the. actual magnitudes, which merely serve
as a mathematical convenience. A more refined determination of
utility (von Neumann-Morgenstern utility) can be calculated on the
basis of individual choices between uncertain alternatives, provided
certain assumptions are satisfied. Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
levels come somewhat closer to being meaningful quantitative
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measurements than other utility functions. Because only the ratios
between an individual's utilities are fixed by this procedure rather
than their absolute magnitudes, however, we cannot use the von
Neumann-Morgenstern procedure as a basis for comparing the utility
levels of two different individuals. 10
Since utility comparisons between individuals are not meaningful
under the conventional approach, we can compare different states of
the world only in a qualitative way. Economists most often use the
Pareto standard to define efficiency.11 Consider two states of the
world, A and B. We say that A is Pareto-superior to B if a motion to
shift from B to A would pass without dissent - that is, A ranks higher
than B in the preference ranking of at least one person, who votes for
the change, and the others are at worst indifferent to the change, so no
one else objects. Pareto superiority is an intuitively appealing stan
dard, since at least one person is better off because of the change and
no one else is hurt. Essentially, the Pareto standard avoids the need
for interpersonal comparisons by giving each individual a veto over
changes. Because it seems to avoid any controversial value judgments,
economists have favored the Pareto standard as the basis of what has
been called the "new welfare economics."12
In reality, however, Pareto improvements are often hard to find.
Because unanimous consent is unlikely to exist for changes in legal
rules, law and economics practitioners often fall back to a broader but
less compelling standard, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Alternative A is
Kaldor-Hicks superior to alternative B if some people are better
off with A and would be willing to fully compensate the "losers," re
gardless of whether or not such compensation is ever actually paid
(pp. 458-59). The Kaldor-Hicks standard has two drawbacks, one
technical and the other moral. The technical drawback is that the
standard can be indeterminate - if sufficiently large wealth shifts are
involved, A can be more efficient than B while B is also more efficient
than A.13 The moral objection is that Kaldor-Hicks ignores equity
entirely, so that some people may be much worse off even though a
change is economically efficient. Kaldor-Hicks improvements are
arguably fair when everyone had an equal chance beforehand of being

10. The use of v on Neumann -M orgenstern uti lities a ll ows us t o determine the utility of
an uncertain outc ome, which is merely the probability of the outcome times its u tility if it
d oes occur. F or an introduc ti on to utility functi ons, see JAMES HENDERSON & RICHARD
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 8-18, 56-61 (3d ed.
1980).
1 1. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
49 (1996).
12.

See DAVID

A. STARRETT, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 10 (1988).

13. See ANDREU

MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 831 (1999).
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on the winning side, but this is not always a realistic assumption.14
When the Pareto principle does not apply and Kaldor-Hicks seems
inadequate to deal with the issue of fairness, the conventional view
requires us to look outside economics for guidance.
This brings us to the welfarist approach favored by Kaplow and
Shavell, which is a variant of what has been called the "old" welfare
economics.15 As they explain, their approach also begins with the
concept of individual utility. The utility function expresses the individ
ual's ordering of outcomes, with expected utility being used in cases of
uncertainty (pp. 24-25 n.15). Thus, the utility index "incorporates in a
positive way everything that an individual might value - goods and
services that the individual can consume, social and environmental
amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings
for others, and so forth" (p. 18). Individuals may be mistaken about
how outcomes will affect them. Hence, the utility index should relate
to "what they would prefer if they correctly understood how they
would be affected - rather than to individuals' well-being as reflected
in their mistaken preferences" (p. 23).
Kaplow and Shavell do not limit themselves to the Pareto and
Kaldor-Hicks standards in comparing different states of society.
Instead, they base such comparisons on a social welfare function,
which they define formally as a monotonic function of individual
utilities. (This simply means that, all else being equal, an increase in
any individual's utility increases the level of social welfare.) Once the
SWF has been set, we need merely pick the alternative with the higher
value. The key point is that only individual utilities count in deter
mining social welfare (rather than, for instance, individual rights).
Thus, any two outcomes that produce the same levels of utility are
considered identical, whatever the sources of the utility may be. But in
other respects, Kaplow and Shavell maintain, their approach is very
accommodating, because there are many possible choices of SWFs. As
they emphasize, a SWF can be "any increasing function of individuals'
utilities."16 One possibility is classic utilitarianism (where we add
individual utilities), but we might also choose a SWF that gives more
weight to the utility of the worse-off members of society (p. 27).
Defining a SWF requires that we be able to compare individual utility
levels, but Kaplow and Shaven are unfazed by the controversy over
whether this is possible (p. 27 n.20).
14. Pareto optimality is defined in HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra n ote 10, at 286-91.
Under the rubric of "wealth maximization ," the Kaldor-Hicks standard is discussed in P os
ner, supra n ote l (article manuscript at 13-17). Wealth maximizati on is the same as Kald or
Hicks, except that changes in utility are measured by their m onetary equivalents. See
SEIDENFELD, supra n ote 1 1, at 55.
15.

See

STARRETI', supra n ote 12, at 9, 1 1 .

1 6 . P . 2 4 n.1 5. As I discuss i n Part II, h owever, much of their discussi on effectively
presumes that the SWF must be utilitarian.
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Kaplow and Shavell also assume that it is irrelevant which utility
levels are associated with which specific individuals (pp. 25 n.16, 26
n.18, 27 n.20). This assumption is much less innocuous than it may
seem. In effect, this assumption rules out the possibilities that we
might view some people as having morally superior preferences than
others, or that we might consider some people as being more or less
deserving than others because of their character or past conduct.
Mother Theresa's preferences would count just as much in the SWF as
Hitler's, no more and no less.
Welfarism may strike some people as insufficiently sensitive to
issues of equity. If it can be implemented, however, it does offer a
clear improvement over the Kaldor-Hicks standard because it takes
some account of distributional issues. Under Kaldor-Hicks, essentially
all that matters is maximizing social wealth. Holding constant the
combined amount of wealth held by society as a whole, we have to
count as equal (a) the state of the world where wealth is evenly
distributed and (b) the state of the world where everything is owned
by Bill Gates. In contrast, welfarism provides a basis for judging
between different distributions of wealth. With plausible choices of
the utility functions and the SWF, the assignment of wealth to a single
individual will be rejected in favor of equal distribution.17
Still, there are aspects of equity that seem to be lost by the
welfarist approach, such as the intrinsic value of human rights. Kaplow
and Shavell maintain that the welfarist properly excludes these values.
The SWF itself can incorporate certain elements of equity - those
relating to the distribution of individual utilities as opposed to their
sum - but Kaplow and Shaven argue against any additional role for
moral judgments once the SWF has been chosen. In particular, they
reject any notion of fairness that gives "weight to factors that are
independent of individuals' well-being" (p. 44; emphasis omitted). For
example, welfarism precludes libertarian views, in which some societal
improvements might be blocked because they violate individual rights
(p. 26 n.18).
The core of the argument is that use of any intrinsic moral factors
would conflict with the Pareto standard. Kaplow and Shaven argue
that "individuals will be made worse off overall whenever considera
tion of fairness leads to the choice of a regime different from
that which would be adopted under welfare economics because, by
definition, the two approaches conflict when a regime with greater
overall well-being is rejected on grounds of fairness" (p. 52). Thus,

17. F or example, if the marginal utility of m oney decreases and the s ocial welfare func
ti on is additive - the classic utilitarian view - then a m ore equal distributi on of wealth will
always be fav ored. Thus, c ompared with the c onventional ec on omic approach, wel farist
analysis is a great improvement in its handling of questions of equity.
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anyone who believes in intrinsic moral values must be prepared to sac
rifice human welfare.
The conflict is particularly clear when all individuals are identically
situated. In such "symmetrical" situations, it is "always the case that
everyone will be worse off when a notion of fairness leads to the
choice of a different legal rule from that chosen under welfare
economics" (p. 52). The explanation is simple:
Because everyone is identically situated, whenever welfare economics
leads to the choice of one rule over another, it must be that everyone is
better off under the preferred rule. Hence, whenever a notion of fairness
leads one to choose a different rule from that favored under welfare eco
nomics, everyone is necessarily worse off as a result. (p. 52)

Thus, when everyone is situated identically with respect to a rule, any
independent consideration of fairness such as individual rights neces
sarily violates the Pareto principle.
In an important earlier article,18 Kaplow and Shavell provided a
formal proof that even in asymmetrical situations, fairness necessarily
dictates a Pareto-inferior outcome in at least some situations (p. 53
n.75). The proof requires only that fairness be a continuous function,
so that "[t]he fairness assessment cannot change infinitely at the
margin in response to a small, finite change in the level of some
consumption good" (p. 54 n.75). The heart of the proof is as follows: if
some nonwelfare factor X matters, then at least it must be able to
break ties between two states of the world that have equal welfare. If
we assume continuity, then the state of the world with the higher X
value should still be favored when two states of the world are very
close in terms of welfare but not tied. This means that we can end up
favoring a state of the world that is Pareto-inferior.
Kaplow and Shavell's theorem could be less dramatically described
as "The Impossibility of the Paretian Tie-Breaker." What appear to be
innocuous assumptions in a proof sometimes turn out to be stronger
and more contestable,19 but Kaplow and Shavell's formal proof is at
least plausible on its face. In any event, I am in no position to quarrel
with this reasoning, having endorsed a looser version of this argument
myself some years ago in the context of environmental ethics.20 My
18. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment
1 09 J. POL. ECON. 281 (2001). One of the elegant points of the
proof is that it requires only very weak assumptions about continuity and the form of the
utility functions.
Violates the Pareto Principle,

19. For a critique of the continuity assumption, see Chang, supra note 8. A more fun
damental objection may be that Kaplow and Shavell's model views fairness as a component
of the social goal rather than as a constraint. At least some fairness advocates would reject
that conceptualization. See Robert Nozick, Side Constraints, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND
ITS CRITICS 134, 136-38 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
337.

20.

See

Daniel A. Farber, From

Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem,

1986 U. ILL. L. REV.
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normative conclusion, however, was the opposite - that if we attach
intrinsic value to the environment, we should be prepared to make at
least minor incursions on the Pareto principle.21
Somewhat surprisingly, Kaplow and Shaven do not rely in their
book on their formal proof, which they relegate (in paraphrased
"heuristic" form) to a footnote (pp. 53-54 n.75). Instead, they rely on
more traditional normative analysis. Their normative argument may
be clearer if we consider their analysis of tort law, one of several
contexts in which they apply their argument.
. Kaplow and Shaven begin by considering reciprocal accidents,
where everyone is an accident victim as often as an injurer. The
efficient rule is either strict liability or negligence, depending on the
legal costs associated with each rule. Strict liability could result in
more lawsuits, but they will be individually cheaper, since it is not
necessary to consider the issue of fault. There are no distributive
consequences since everyone will be a defendant as often as a plaintiff.
Thus, the choice of rules affects everyone in exactly the same way.
Some notions of fairness might favor one of the two rules. For in
stance, we might take the view that imposing liability on blameless
injurers is unfair. But this fairness-dictated rule might have higher ad
ministrative costs than strict liability, making everyone worse off (pp.
103-06). If we are serious about fairness, however, surely we must be
willing to accept at least a tiny additional administrative cost to
achieve a higher level of fairness. But the administrative costs will be
paid by everyone (since everyone is identically situated), so the net
result is that everyone is worse off under the fair rule. Thus, unless we
are willing to adopt a policy that makes everyone worse off, we must
reject the fairness-based rule.
Kaplow and Shaven argue that, to be consistent, we must therefore
reject the fairness rule across the board, even in nonreciprocal situa
tions.22 They supplement this analysis, however, with an independent
analysis of the nonreciprocal case, where one group is composed of
injurers and the other of victims. Even in the nonreciprocal situation,
Kaplow and Shaven contend, the fundamental conclusion is
unchanged:
The relevant point is that, however many individuals might benefit from
a fairer rule, and however great their benefit might be, the fact that social
welfare is lower means that a judgment has been made that the losses
borne by those who are worse off under the rule are of greater social im-

21. See id. at 346 n.22 ("[E]nvironmental values can at least break ties. Arguing from
continuity, however, a strong environmental preference (by the decisionmaker] should at
least overcome a slight disparity in efficiency.").
22. Pp. 1 10-1 1 . The demand for consistency here seems attenuated. Why shouldn't we
consider fairness concerns to be triggered only by unequal treatment?
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portance with regard to consideration of different individuals' levels of
well-being. (p. 120)

Thus, they conclude, except to the extent that ideas about fairness
might be factored into the social welfare function, fairness should be
irrelevant.
Kaplow and Shavell discuss the practical implication of these
findings at some length. As to ordinary citizens, they say, the use of
social norms in everyday life remains sensible. People cannot be
expected to base their ordinary conduct on complex utility calculations
(pp. 382-83). For government officials, however, welfare maximization
should be the goal within the constraints allowed by the public's naive
belief in social norms of fairness (pp. 396-402). The lesson is even
clearer for legal academics and other policy analysts. Kaplow and
Shavell maintain that serious policy analysts have only one responsible
option: "The duty of analysts is to teach, write, and speak publicly
about the virtues of sound analysis, even at the expense of their own
popularity, particularly in cases in which such analysis may strike a less
expert audience as troubling because its rationale is counterintuitive"
(p. 399). In particular, they maintain:
[w]e do not discharge our responsibility as legal policy experts if we allow
ourselves to be guided by simple norms designed for everyday life, if we
restrict the sophistication of our academic analysis to ensure that it is
fully accessible to those with little welfare economic expertise, and if we
resist being viewed as engaged in a sometimes technical enterprise. (p.
390)

And "undertaking welfare economic analysis in an explicit manner . . .
is the best way to determine which legal rules in fact are most likely to
improve the well-being of members of society" (p. 390).
In sum, Kaplow and Shavell claim to have established that "legal
policy analysis should rely exclusively on welfare economics" (p. 468).
Through pure "deductive logic," they maintain, they have shown that
fairness is untenable: "[L]ogical consistency implies" that if one
endorses fairness "one has thereby endorsed the view that adopting a
legal rule that makes everyone worse off may well be good" (p. 468).
Welfare economics is the one and only true path to good policy: "[W]e
believe that responsible government decisionmakers will be able to
make better policy decisions if those who analyze legal policy devote
themselves to identifying the effects of legal rules on individuals' well
being - that is, if they employ welfare economics rather than base
their analysis on notions of fairness" (p. 472).
This ambitious program for policy analysts assumes not only that
fairness can be rejected as a valid value, but that social welfare func
tions can provide a complete method for social choice. Since
welfarism, a la Kaplow and Shaven, requires the application of a social
welfare function to individual utilities, we are immediately faced with
two questions. First, assuming the utilities are given, how do we find
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the right SWF? Second, how do we get the utilities in the first place?
To these we can add a third question: If the welfarist program turns
out not to be viable, can economics make any other contribution to
identifying equitable outcomes?
II.

DEFINING SOCIAL WELFARE

Aggregation is not a problem under the cost-benefit approach
favored by Posner. We simply add up everyone's monetary valuations
of various states of the world, using existing prices. The option with
the highest number is the cost-benefit winner. This procedure has
some drawbacks. As mentioned earlier, it is sometimes indeterminate
where large wealth shifts are involved. Also, determining the appro
priate dollar values is not always easy. Finally, whether the results
have anything to say about fairness is debatable.23 Thus, cost-benefit
analysis is no panacea. But for the believer in economic efficiency, the
aggregation part of the process could not be easier.
Not so for the welfarist. The concept of a SWF is quite broad in
scope: any function of utility distributions that increases whenever
individual utility goes up. (This assumes that we have already
determined utilities, the subject of the next section. For now, however,
let us put aside the problem of defining utility and assume that
suitable utility functions exist.) Choosing a SWF might be only a
minor technical step if we generally obtained the same outcome
regardless of our specific choice for the SWF. But in reality, the choice
of a specific SWF often controls the outcome. In this Part, I demon
strate that fact and its impact on our understanding of welfarism.
Kaplow and Shavell's theory is incomplete and in some respects
ambiguous about the definition of the SWF. To be a serious program,
welfarism would need criteria for choosing between SWFs, a specifica
tion of which SWFs are candidates for adoption, and a set of
non-welfarist constitutional rules for society to follow in choosing
between SWFs. Kaplow and Shaven provide none of this. Without
such restrictions, however, they cannot exclude the possible decision
rule: "Pick the SWF which, when applied, produces the fairest possible
outcome."24 Of course, this rule is logically consistent with welfarism,
because we will ultimately use only this SWF to design ordinary rules
of contract law, criminal law, and so forth. So we can pretend that all
23. The best fairness argument is that ex ante, everyone can expect to win from eco
nomically efficient rules: the fact that the rules will turn out ex post to favor some and not
others should not be a decisive objection when the gamble is one that everyone would have
accepted initially. This argument for fairness depends critically on the shift to the ex ante
perspective. The validity of this shift turns out to be more complicated and limited in scope
than most advocates seem to realize, so the fairness of Kaldor-Hicks remains debatable. For
a fuller discussion, see Farber, Ex Ante Perspective, supra note 3, for a fuller discussion.
24. More specifically, the fairest Pareto-efficient outcome.
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of these legal rules are designed on the basis of the most unalloyed
focus on social welfare. But the game will be rigged - we will have
chosen the SWF so that the end result of our supposedly undivided
attention to welfare will satisfy our notions of fairness. Kaplow and
Shavell may have in mind some set of criteria that excludes such
SWFs, but they do not provide them.
In any event, Kaplow and Shavell's official position is that no basis
exists for selecting a unique correct SWF. As we will see in more detail
below, this position implies the existence of nonwelfarist legal rules. If
there are at least two possible candidates for the SWF, then society
will need a mechanism for choosing between them. (Of course, people
would be unlikely to debate and vote on the mathematical formulation
of the function: what they would discuss is which criteria should
determine the distribution of well-being among the members of
society.) Except in the extremely unlikely event that a single mecha
nism maximizes every individual's welfare, the design of this mecha
nism cannot be based on maximizing social welfare. Thus, if there are
even two candidate functions, Kaplow and Shavell's claim fails: there
are at least some legal rules (the constitutional procedures for select
ing a welfare function) which are not based solely on maximizing
social welfare.25
As mentioned earlier, Kaplow and Shavell may fail to appreciate
this problem because (contrary to their official position on this point)
they may implicitly assume· that the SWF is utilitarian, so there is
really nothing to choose. Whether or not this really is their true incli
nation, it would at least allow them to escape from the need for
nonwelfare-based constitutional rules. But it would only exacerbate
the problems discussed in Part III.
A.

The Pivotal Importance of SWF Selection

As it turns out, the choice of a SWF is just about as outcome
determinative as it possibly . could be. Given any listing of social
outcomes that does not violate the Pareto principle, we can find a
SWF that comes out the same way. As shown in the Appendix, we can
construct a suitable SWF for any ordering over any finite set of points,
so long as the ordering is not chosen in a way that violates Pareto (or
that precludes symmetry or convexity if we also desire those qualities).
In other words, the concept of a SWF is extremely flexible. As a
matter of methodology, this is a desirable quality of the SWF concept
25. Moreover, in societies such as ours, the constitutional rules are not necessarily
severable from other legal rules. Because the wealthy enjoy more of a political voice in our
society, income distribution is, in part, a constitutional issue, not just a welfarist issue. That
is, a complete specification of our society's rules for making political decisions (including the
decision of how egalitarian to be) would include the rules for obtaining wealth inasmuch as
those rules also help determine political influence.
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because it allows the use of a SWF to represent as broad a range of
orderings as possible. But it also makes the choice of a SWF critical to
the results of any welfare analysis. Subject to these restrictions,
welfarism is like an Enron accountant: it can give us whatever answer
we prefer about how to rank any finite set of alternatives.
This result is stronger in one respect than we need because we
don't really need to know the complete ranking of any list of social
states, only the social state that is picked as best. It is also weaker than
we want because we might have an infinite number of choices. But
there is a standard theorem in welfare economics that serves equally
well (though a little less dramatically) to show why the choice of a
SWF is so critical. According to this theorem, we can always construct
a social welfare function which favors whatever Pareto-efficient
alternative we happen to like best.26 In short, as a leading text puts it:
"[A] competitive market system will give efficient allocations but it
says nothing about distribution. The choice of distribution of income is
the same as the choice of a reallocation of endowments, and this in
turn is equivalent to choosing a particular welfare function."27 Thus,
adopting a welfarist approach does nothing in itself to solve the
problem of social equity. Everything depends on the choice of SWF,
and with the right choice of SWF we can justify practically any
outcome we want.
This is perhaps an overly involved lead-up to a very simple point.
If a welfarist approach means little without the choice of a SWF, and if
there are multiple viable candidates, then a choice must be made. That
being so, there must be some procedure for making the choice.
Obviously, we cannot use welfarism to select the procedure itself: until
we have used the procedure, we can't pick a SWF, and without the
SWF, we can't practice welfarism. Moreover, it will not normally be
the case that everyone in society agrees on a SWF, even if we can get
them to put aside the fact that the choice of a SWF will determine the
choice of legal rules and thereby their own welfare. So we must choose
a SWF-selection procedure on some basis other than welfare. In
Shavell and Kaplow's terms, the value used to select the procedure
must be a form of fairness, since it is nonwelfarist.

26. More specifically, this theorem holds that for any Pareto-efficient allocation, x*, and
any concave, continuous, and monotonic utility functions, x* maximizes some SWF (actually,
a weighted sum of the utility functions.) See HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
198-202 (2d ed. 1984). The proof is quite elegant. If x* is Pareto-efficient given the resource
constraint, we know from the second theorem of welfare economics that x* is the competi
tive equilibrium for some initial allocation of resources. That is, there is a set of prices at
which supply and demand would balance for each good at x*, starting from that initial
allocation. We can then set the relevant weights as the reciprocals of the marginal utility of
income for each agent.
27.

Id.

at 209.
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This means that, unless we can eliminate all but one candidate
SWF a priori, the rules used by society to select its SWF must be
determined on some basis other than social welfare. This is not a mere
quibble. The question of how to choose a SWF - how to weigh utility
- has potentially decisive societal impact. Either everyone in society
must get a vote on the result or some subgroup must make the
decision. In essence, the rules of constitutional law determine who gets
to make the decision and what procedures they must use. The rules
must dictate who gets to vote and what discussions are allowed
beforehand. Hence, we have at least one important counter-example
to the thesis that Shavell and Kaplow propound, which is that fairness
is never relevant to the choice of legal rules. At the very least, it
seems, fairness must be critical to some of the rules of constitutional
law.
Nor can we assume that the social welfare function is chosen once
and for all at some kind of constitutional convention. Every time
society faces a new policy decision, it might conceivably want to
reconsider its choice of SWF. But since there is always a SWF that
favors any Pareto-efficient allocation, this simply throws us back on
the ultimate, nonwelfarist issue of fairness in every case. Rational
individuals will choose a SWF that produces the outcome they most
prefer, so nonwelfarist preferences about outcomes will drive the
choice of SWF. In short, welfarism may turn out to be vacuous,
providing the following recipe for decisionmakers:
1. Choose the fairest of the Pareto-efficient outcomes.
2. Generate a SWF that is maximized at that outcome.
3. Apply the SWF.
4. Pick the predetermined outcome.
B.

The Utilitarian Solution

The need to use fairness considerations to select a SWF seemingly
ought to be a ground for very serious concern for Kaplow and Shaven.
Yet, they seem to regard the choice of a utility function as a purely
technical issue, which they mostly relegate to scattered footnotes.
Indeed, although they do not say so, they seem to assume that
the welfare function will take a single particular form. As they
explain their view of the proper procedure, first an analyst chooses a
numerical representation of each individual's utility functions and
then she chooses a function, F, to "aggregate" these numbers (p. 24
n.15). As they explain, this means that if the initial choice of utility
functions is not precisely comparable, we can use the SWF to make
adjustments so that the aggregate comes out right. Their focus on
"aggregation" is the key. Although Kaplow and Shavell never say so,
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their argument really only makes sense if we assume that the SWF is
utilitarian and simply adds up individual utilities.28
This implicit assumption about the form of the social welfare func
tion is also crucial to another part of their argument. One of their
major criticisms of fairness is that it is applied ex post rather than ex
ante (pp. 442-43). But welfarism allows unambiguous reliance on ex
ante evaluations only for a narrow class of SWFs. We can illustrate
this with a simple example. Suppose that Ann and Mary have identical
utility functions which are a linear function of their wealth. (Hence,
they are risk neutral.) Suppose that, for each of them, U($1,000) 1
and U($0) 0. Now they get a chance to play a lottery for the price of
$1000 apiece. If they agree to play, a coin will be flipped, and the
winner will get $3,000. The expected value of the lottery to each is 'l2
of $3,000, or $1,500, which gives them a utility of 1.5 units as opposed
to the 1 unit they currently enjoy. Hence, they will both want to play.
Now, imagine that society is faced with the decision of whether to
allow such a lottery. If the SWF simply adds utility functions, then it
doesn't matter whether we determine social welfare ex ante or ex post.
If we do so ex ante, we add the two expected utility figures of 1.5 to
obtain a total social welfare of 3. If we perform the same calculation
ex post, we know that one of the individuals will have a utility of 0 and
the other will have 3, for the same total as before. Hence, social
welfare is the same, whether we evaluate it ex ante or ex post.
Suppose instead that society prefers utility to be evenly distributed.
For example, instead of adding individual utilities, the SWF might add
the square roots of those utilities, a calculation which favors more
equal distributions. Using this SWF, society's current welfare level is
the square root of one plus the square root of one, or 2. Should society
agree to the lottery? If we perform the calculation ex ante, we add the
square root of 1.5 to the square root of 1.5. This sum is greater than 2,
the welfare level of the status quo. Hence, we should approve the
lottery. But if we perform the calculation ex post, then the welfare
level is determined to be the square root of 3 (the winner's utility) plus
the square root of zero (the loser's utility). This is less than 2, the
welfare level of the status quo, so the ex post analysis says to reject the
lottery. With this welfare function, although the lottery would obtain
everyone's consent ex ante, it turns out to be welfare-decreasing
ex post. In other words, the welfarist tells us to approve a lottery
ex ante which is known with complete certainty to make society worse
off ex post. As Kaplow and Shaven themselves observe in passing in a
=

=

28. Indeed, at one point, they use the telltale phrase: "once a social welfare function is
chosen (that is, once a judgment about aggregation is made[)] . . . ." P. 27 n.23 (internal cross
reference omitted). The word "aggregation" suggests that they are implicitly assuming that
the SWF is additive.
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footnote, the only way to avoid such discrepancies and maintain the
purity of the ex ante approach is to use a utilitarian SWF (p. 443 n.95).
This problem also affects at least one of Kaplow and Shavell's
specific policy recommendations, which involves criminal punish
ments. If detecting and punishing an individual offender is costly (as it
always is), we can save money by punishing fewer offenders but
ramping up the sentence to reflect the decreased probability of detec
tion. Thus, if the harm is 100 and there are four offenders, we can get
equivalent deterrence either by catching all of them and imposing a
sentence of 100 or by randomly catching one of the four and imposing
a sentence of 400 (pp. 319-20). Given the enforcement costs, we
should adopt the latter alternative, contrary to the usual view that
sentences should be proportional to the harm in individual causes.29
If society does not use a linear welfare function, however, it may
prefer to impose a punishment on all convicted criminals at level 100
despite the higher enforcement costs, rather than punishing a quarter
of the criminals at level 400. We can see this effect with our
two-person society, defining the SWF as before to be the sum of the
square roots of the individual utilities. Suppose that our two individual
criminals are each currently at a utility level of 2. We have a choice
between randomly catching one of them and imposing a punishment
of 2, or catching both and imposing a punishment of 1. Ex ante, both
the individuals and society are indifferent between these alternatives,
so even minute enforcement costs would be enough to favor adoption
of the random strategy. But ex post, society would regret this choice as
inequitable. With uniform fair punishment, both criminals end up with
utilities of 1, leading to an ex post social welfare level of 2. With
random heightened punishment, one criminal ends up at 2 and the
29. For a discussion of the more conventional view, see B I X, supra note 3, at 1 10-11 . The
form in which Kaplow and Shavell cast their argument does not seem to be quite right. They
argue that this alternative (less likely but more serious punishment) is perfectly fair because
when the expected value of the punishment is greater than the benefit of committing the
crime, deterrence is completely effective and no one ever has to be punished. P. 319. "Note
as well," they argue, "that the only real sense in which potential criminals are treated poorly
when the sanction is 400 is that they are deterred from committing a crime that they would
find it in their self-interest to commit were they under the regime with the fair punishment."
P. 324. But zero crime is not a Nash equilibrium, because society's threat to continue to in
vest in crime detection when the crime rate is zero is not credible. (For a discussion of this
equilibrium concept, see MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 246-50.) In their basic
model, Kaplow and Shavell assume this issue away by positing a fixed, costless level of crime
detection. P. 31 8 n.48. This is clearly unrealistic. If no crimes are ever committed, a rational
society should invest no resources in crime detection. But when that happens, no criminals
are punished, so violations increase. The solution is clearly a mixed equilibrium in which so
ciety sometimes enforces and criminals sometimes offend. At any level of penalty, some
criminals will still violate the law and some of them will be punished, with the latter propor
tion depending on how much society invests in law enforcement. But this does not affect the
basic argument that Kaplow and Shavell want to make, which is that we can get the same
amount of deterrence with lower transactions costs by using a higher level of punishment. As
they correctly observe, their basic claim holds even with imperfect deterrence. Pp. 331-36.
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other at 0, leading to an ex post social welfare level equal to the square
root of 2. This is lower than the ex post welfare level for uniform
penalties. Thus, ex post, society prefers the more equal level of
punishment. A welfarist can confidently advocate the "efficient
punishment" scheme only by assuming that the ex post and ex ante
welfare levels will be identical. And this will be true only for a
utilitarian SWF.
As we have seen, some aspects of the Kaplow and Shaven argu
ment makes sense only if we assume that they are not merely
welfarists but utilitarians, so there is essentially only one possible
SWF. Thus utilitarianism ensures that we can use ex ante evaluations
without trepidation and also that we do not have to worry about
fairness-based constitutional rules for picking the SWF. In short,
Kaplow and Shaven provide an important argument in favor of
utilitarianism. Essentially, they have shown that if we assume the
possibility of a interpersonal comparisons of utility and demand that
ex post and ex ante social judgments agree, then only utilitarianism is
consistent with the Pareto principle. (In principle, a utilitarian SWF
would allow different weightings for different individuals' utilities. But
if we do the utilities right in the first place, then Kaplow and Shaven's
symmetry principle requires equal weightings, since we are supposed
to count the properly computed measure of each person's utility
equally.) The converse of the conclusion is equally significant: if we do
not demand this form of temporal consistency, there will not be a
unique SWF, and some fairness value must be invoked as a basis for
the constitutional rules used by society to pick a SWF.
The demand for temporal consistency is not an unreasonable one,
so utilitarianism enjoys a significant advantage under this analysis.30
But utilitarianism puts additional pressure on other parts of their
theory. Other SWFs pay some attention to how utility is distributed.
For example, the square-root function discussed earlier favors equal
distribution of utility, which in normative terms means that we attach
independent importance to having every individual enjoy a reasonably
good life. Utilitarianism is a more radical break with individualism,
30. This may be an even stronger argument for utilitarianism than the discussion in the
text suggests. When we talk about ex post and ex ante analysis in this setting, we are not
really talking about the passage of time. Rather, we are talking about a change in our infor
mation about the impact of a decision - but the additional information seems to be irrele
vant! In the examples discussed earlier, we know in the ex ante situation that one of two in
dividuals will be affected; in the ex post situation, we know the name of the affected
individual. But since the individuals are identical in every relevant respect, it's hard to see
why knowing or not knowing the name should change society's choice; after all, we knew
that it had to be one of them or the other anyway. Thus, requiring consistency between the
ex ante and ex post perspectives really just means that the presence or absence of irrelevant
information should not affect societal preferences. This seems like an eminently reasonable
requirement. If we accept this relevance requirement, we get equivalence between ex ante
and ex post assessments, and hence the SWF must be utilitarian.
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since it treats individuals as nothing more than vessels into which
utility can be poured. In theory, the utilitarian would be happy to have
the entire human race extinct except for one person, if that one person
could be made ecstatic enough as a result. Thus, utilitarianism raises
more troubling ethical concerns than other forms of welfarism.
Moreover, utilitarianism also raises the ante in technical terms by
requiring unit-for-unit comparisons between different individuals'
utilities. The highest possible demands are therefore made on our
ability to make interpersonal comparisons. Apart from the technical
problems, Kaplow and Shavell face the challenge of defining utility
in such convincing terms that we are willing to accept the Pareto prin
ciple as an absolute dogma regardless of any other moral principles.
Thus, Kaplow and Shaven can escape the problems discussed in this
section through utilitarianism, but only at the cost of worsening the
problems discussed in the next section.
Ill.

DEFINING UTILITY

There are three main issues relating to utility. Exactly what prefer
ences count in determining utility? Are preferences an appropriate
basis for determining social welfare? And can we actually make
the required measurements of utility as a practical matter? Since
utilitarianism has been around for well over a century, there is a
voluminous literature about these issues. Fortunately, we need not
consider the issues in great depth. It is clear that at best welfarism is a
long way from being a practical method of deciding all questions of
equity. Of course, we could easily create some scheme of utility
indexes. But it is harder, by orders of magnitude, to create an index
that guarantees aggregate social utility really will indicate the overall
well-being of everyone in society in some meaningful sense.31
We begin with the first question: defining the relevant set of
preferences. In terms of the types of preferences that count, Kaplow
and Shavell take a forthright position. According to them, all
preferences are created equal.32 We should not, therefore, discard
preferences such as racism or sadism in calculating social welfare:
To trump preferences is, in essence, to redefine individuals' well-being
in a manner that substitutes some other preferences - ones that are
cleansed, so to speak - for individuals' actual preferences . . . . But such
an approach is troubling from the perspective of welfare economics be
cause the moral force and appeal of welfare economics lies in promoting
31. For insightful general discussions of these issues, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1 09-18 (2d ed. 1963); AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 30-57 (1 988).
32. It should be noted that the other most prominent welfarist in the legal academy
takes the contrary position. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A
Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 262-67 (2000).
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the actual well-being of people, not in advancing some hypothetical no
tion of satisfaction that is distinct from that of the individuals who are the
objects of our concern. Furthermore, employing a cleansed version of
preferences rather than actual preferences may lead one to favor policies
that make everyone worse off, just as when a notion of fairness is
pursued at the expense of individuals' well-being. (pp. 419-20)

Moreover, they add, "[t]he idea of an analyst substituting his or
her own conception of what individuals should value for the actual
views of the individuals themselves conflicts with individuals' basic
autonomy and freedom" (pp. 421-22).
There are two problems with this claim. The more obvious one is
that it makes the link between utility and "well-being" problematic.
Although we may want the lives of all individuals to "go well," it is not
clear that this means helping them to satisfy any possible preference
they might have, no matter how morally objectionable.33 We may not
think, for example, that satisfying the preferences of a rapist should
count as increasing his well-being or should prima facie be counted as
an improvement in social welfare (from which his victim's pain will
then be subtracted.). If Shavell and Kaplow did a global search and
replace, substituting "desire gratification" for the words "welfare" and
"well-being" throughout their book, the meaning would be entirely
preserved but much of their normative argument would fall flat. For
example, their basic theorem would read: "Adopting fairness as a
binding norm necessarily entails the occasional possibility of at least
slightly reducing the desire gratification of everyone in society." It is
not self-evident that the rephrased version is a knock-down argument
against fairness.
Kaplow and Shavell attempt to answer this objection, but their
answer seems to come down to the empirical claim that in most
instances, objectionable preferences will be outweighed by the bad
consequences to others of fulfilling those preferences (pp. 427-31).
They do not really dispute that objectionable preferences may win out
under their approach in some cases. Counting fulfillment of these
objectionable preferences is necessary to their version of the Pareto
principle. But their own argument against fairness can be turned
against them here. They argue that fairness must be rejected as a
general principle as a matter of consistency, because in some
circumstances fairness violates our commitment to the Pareto
principle (p. 56). But now we can equally argue that the welfarism
(and with it, the Pareto principle) must be rejected as a matter of

33. Alternative and perhaps more appealing views of utility have been offered by other
utilitarians. See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST 1 2-28 (1973).
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consistency, because in some circumstances it violates our commit
ment to other moral principles.34
Moreover, the Kaplow-and-Shavell view of utility, rather than
respecting individual values as an aspect of autonomy and freedom,
actually implies that society should be free to manipulate individual
desires at will. Kaplow and Shaven view the failure to anticipate future
preference shifts as being a form of imperfect information, which
society should correct (p. 411). In their view, society can treat such a
change in preferences either as an individual's failure to anticipate his
own future preferences or as a failure to anticipate how his fixed
preferences would respond to much different circumstances (p. 412
n.31). Hence,
if it is discovered that individuals are able to adapt to certain physical
disabilities more or less readily than is commonly supposed, the valua
tions employed in measuring tort damages or in performing cost-benefit
analysis (for example, of highway safety improvements) should reflect
actual harm rather than victims' uninformed ex ante estimates. (p. 413)

The logical implication seems to be that, if accident victims perfectly
adapted their preferences to their new limitations, we should not
count a serious disability as a utility cost to them at all. Prospective
victims currently might think that they prefer not to be disabled, but
we (the exalted legal policy analysts) would know better.
Again, whatever might be said for this view of well-being in the
abstract, it does make the Pareto principle less than a self-evident
moral truism. Suppose, for example, that a change in tort law saves a
penny in everyone's insurance bill, while adding only one accident
victim. Assume that the accident victim, while severely disabled, will
adapt psychologically to the disability and in fact will be happier as a
result because of his access to powerful painkillers. In this situation,
fairness might require us to veto what Shaven and Kaplow regard as a
Pareto improvement, but so what?
In sum, it is not clear that utility, as Kaplow and Shavell define it,
can actually carry the moral weight · necessary to uphold their
argument against fairness. Reducing the Pareto principle to the Prozac
principle deprives it of some of its moral force. It is possible that the
definition of utility could be refined so as to make the Pareto principle
more compelling, but whether this can be done without causing other
difficulties for welfarism remains to be seen.
So far, we have been considering the difficulty of defining
individual utility in a way that convincingly corresponds to some

34. As a fallback, they suggest that preference-cleansing must be rejected because of the
absence of any clear standards for doing so. Pp. 418-31. But again, this argument can be
turned against them. Because it fails to specify clear grounds for choosing a SWF, their own
theory would fall prey to the same demand for clarity that they impose on others.
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notion of "well-being."35 Yet welfarism requires not only that we do
this on an individual basis, but that we be able to make interpersonal
comparisons of utility and in some way combine them. Whether
combining individual utilities is morally appropriate or even possible is
highly controversial. Here, again, there are two subissues.
The first subissue is whether combining individual utilities is
appropriate even if it is possible. Posner makes the classic argument:
[B]y aggregating utility across persons, utilitarianism treats people as
cells in the overall social organism rather than as individuals. This is the
source of the familiar barbarism of utilitarian ethics, such as the deliber
ate sacrifice of innocents to maximize the total amount of happiness in
the society (or in the world, or the universe), or the "utility monster"
whose capacity for sadistic pleasure so far exceeds the capacity of his vic
tims to experience pain that utility is maximized by allowing him to
commit rape and murder. Defenders of utilitarianism seek to deflect such
criticisms by pointing out that lack of trust in officials would defeat any
effort to empower the state to attempt to maximize utility on an individ
ual basis . . . . But practical objections to the logical implications of utili
tarianism miss the point. The logic itself is repulsive. Even if we assume
away all the problems of implementation, and contemplate the result the inducement of blissful trances by utterly benign, democratically re
sponsive officials - we still don't like it.36

Thus, maximizing the value of the SWF may not be an appealing way
to formulate society's goals.
The second argument against utilitarianism, which applies more
generally to welfarism, is that quantitative comparison of individuals'
utility is meaningless. Despite philosophical qualms, most of us have
no hesitancy in concluding on occasion that one individual's well-being
is higher than another's. But welfarism requires that we be able to
make such judgments with great precision between any two hypotheti
cal individuals. For instance, if Abby likes apples and Paula likes
poetry, we need to be able to say how many apples Abby needs to eat
in order to obtain the same degree of satisfaction that Paula gets from
reading each specific poem. Partly this can be seen as a measurement
problem, but partly it is a philosophical one: Does it really mean
anything to try to reduce these two very different experiences to a
common metric?
If all we have to go on is the preference listings of each of the two
individuals, we may find it impossible to come up with a cardinal scale.
We know that Abby likes having one apple, likes having two better,
etc. We have similar information about Paula. We could obviously
35. This has been the primary ground for criticism of Kaplow and Shavell to date; all of
the sources in note 8, supra, at least touch on (some are devoted exclusively to) this issue.
See also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L.
REV. 4 (1994).
36. Posner, supra note !(article manuscript at 1 1 -12).
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assign common numbers to the scales - for example, assigning a util
ity of one to each apple for Abby and each poem for Paula. But it is
very unclear whether, even in principle, there is a convincing way of
converting their individual rankings into a shared numerical scale.37
The alternative is to use some gauge of the intensity of preferences (as
opposed to their rankings). This seems at least theoretically possible.
For example, it might turn out that our common sense judgments
about the relative happiness of different people correlates closely
with their levels of certain neurotransmitters. If so, we could use the
neurotransmitter levels as our utility index. (Under this approach the
welfarist motto would be: "[T]he greatest endorphins for the greatest
number.") Whether this is a morally appealing goal would remain
unclear, but at least it would operationalize the concept of interper
sonal utility comparisons. Of course, utilitarians have a variety of
other ingenious ideas about how to measure well-being, and one of
these may eventually work. At present, however, basing a theory on
quantitative comparisons of welfare is reminiscent of the punchline of
the famous joke, in which an economist solves the problem of how to
open a can on a desert island simply by proclaiming, "Assume a can
opener."
Even if we could reliably compare the welfare levels of different
individuals, we would still be left with the third problem - we would
need to determine each individual's full set of preferences, so we can
connect utility states with outcomes. The difficulty is that, if they know
the information will be used to determine social policies that affect
them, individuals have an incentive to misrepresent those preferences.
It turns out to be very difficult to design schemes that will provide the
proper incentives for individuals to truthfully reveal their preferences.
Such schemes suffer from two general flaws. Such schemes can
become quite complex, often making them unworkable in practice. In
addition, they have an unavoidable fault, which is that they do not
operate on a balanced budget. In other words, the schemes require
taxes and side payments that do not even out, so either society must
provide subsidies to the participants or must expropriate some of their
assets.38 Of course, the cost of calculating and then utilizing complete
information about individual preferences may seem like a mere tech
nical detail. But information problems are basic to modern economic
analysis. We should bear in mind that in the absence of similar kinds

37. Daniel Hausman argues that the only logically coherent method of doing so is to
assign a utility of zero to the very worst possibility that each individual can imagine and a
utility of one to the best. This has the unfortunate effect, however, of making the social wel
fare function depend on how imaginative individual members of society happen to be, which
seems implausible. See Daniel M. Hausman. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Com
parisons, 1 04 MIND 473, 480-81 ( 1995).
38.

See VARIAN, supra

note 26, at 256-59.
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of informational costs, a completely centrally planned economy could
perform exactly as well as a free market. While it is theoretically
possible to design a mechanism to force truthful revelation of prefer
ences, the practical barriers are severe.
At the extremes, the direction of a change in collective welfare
may be clear for any plausible method of defining and measuring
welfare, allowing the welfarist to come to reasonably definite conclu
sions. But if welfarism is to play the kind of role envisioned by Kaplow
and Shavell - completely replacing all other norms for social deci
sionmaking - we need more than the unproven promise that the util
ity-measurement problem can be solved. Certainly no such solution is
on the horizon. In the meantime, however, it is worth considering
whether economics can make any contribution to addressing equity
problems on a less global scale.
IV. IM PLEMENTIN G EQUITY
In this Part, I will provide a brief survey of some of the ways in
which economic theory actually can contribute . to our understanding
of equity issues.39 The methods discussed below in Section IV.A have
been extensively discussed by tax scholars. In contrast, those discussed
in Sections IV.B and IV.C cry out for further elaboration. That will
have to wait, however, for another occasion.
A.

Optimal Taxation

Prior to their article on welfare and fairness, Kaplow and Shaven
were best known for their double-distortion argument. This argument
holds as a general matter that the tax system is a more efficient way of
engaging in redistribution than the regulatory system. Although their
full argument is technical and complex, the basic rationale is straight
forward. Suppose we readjust some economically effic;ient legal rule so
that the new rule redistributes income from the rich to the poor. Since
we have moved away from the efficient rule, there is necessarily a
direct efficiency cost to the rule change. But there is also a second
distortion. Just as someone considering an additional hour of work
might be deterred by an increase in the marginal tax rate, so they
might be deterred by knowing that they are making themselves targets
for disadvantageous legal rules. Thus, besides the direct distortionary
effects of the redistributive rule, it also has the same distortionary
effect on the labor supply as the income tax. Hence, Kaplow and

39. Empirical economics may also have a useful contribution to make. Empirical find
ings provide considerable evidence about the structure of fairness norms in our society. See,
e. g. , Norman J. Finkel, Blll It's Not Fair!, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 898 (2000); Martin
Nowak et al., Fairness versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773 (2000).
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Shavell maintain, we can always transfer the same amount of funds
more efficiently just by raising the tax rate.40
This conclusion is not ironclad, as Kaplow and Shavell themselves
admit.41 If what we are trying to equalize is not income but rather
some quantity that correlates with income, or if individuals differ in
their responses to legal incentives, legal rules can add to the efficiency
of redistribution.42 We can illustrate this with the following simple
example. Suppose that we are utilitarians and want to maximize the
sum of utility (putting aside the definitional and measurement
problems discussed in the last section). If income has declining
marginal utility for individuals, then redistribution of income from the
wealthy to the poor will increase overall utility. But if individual utility
functions differ, then at any given income level, the marginal utility of
income will be different for some people than for others. We can
improve our redistribution scheme by adding a feature that sorts
people out according to their marginal utility for money. We might be
able to do this with a simple modification in tort damage awards.
Suppose that some type of accident can be avoided simply by being
more attentive and sober-minded, but that it is more fun to be
carefree. Let's assume that the resulting utility loss is the same for
everybody. When people are careless, they sometimes cause accidents.
Given those assumptions, we can improve our redistribution system by
employing a contributory negligence regime and adding a surcharge to
damages. This is by no means a far-fetched hypothetical. Although
current tort rules ignore income levels, it's easy to imagine juries
augmenting damage awards against wealthy individuals (as revealed,
for example, by being the driver of a luxury car involved in an
accident).
Here's how the damage surcharge works. In deciding how careful
to bt:, individuals compare the lost utility from being careful with the
potential lost utility from paying damages. The first of these items is
fixed but the latter depends on the individual's marginal utility for
money. Hence, all things being equal, people with a lower marginal
utility for money will be more likely to be careless, whereas people
with a higher marginal utility will not. Thus, the level of care is a signal
of marginal income utility. Now consider a tort suit. The defendant
will lose only if he was careless, which means that he is more likely to
40. The theory is summarized in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules
Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing In
come, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) [hereinafter Ka plow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Fa
vor the Poor?].
41.

See id.

at 827-32.

42. For more complete explanations of this point, see Chris William Sanchirico, Decon
structing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Chris William San
chirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
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lose if his marginal utility of income is low. (Recall that people who
remain careless despite the prospect of tort litigation have a low
marginal utility for money.) Because we are assuming a contributory
negligence regime, the plaintiff will win only if he was careful,
meaning that he has a high marginal utility of income. Thus, the
damage surcharge will transfer money from individuals with a lower
marginal utility for money to those with a higher marginal utility, just
the kind of redistribution favored by the utilitarian.43 In contrast, the
income tax collector does not seem to have any method of determin
ing individual differences in utility curves, so he cannot take advantage
of these difference in marginal utility between individuals who have
the same income. In theory, then, the tort surcharge could improve the
redistributive accuracy of the legal system. This improved redistribu
tion comes at an efficiency cost (an inefficient decrease in the number
of accidents and possibly an indirect effect on labor supply). But the
efficiency cost might be worthwhile if we sufficiently value equity.44
Thus, the double-distortion argument is not an ironclad proof of
the universal superiority of taxes over legal rules in redistribution.
Nevertheless, it makes two very important contributions to our under
standing of redistributive legal rules. First, the argument probably
43. We could achieve a similar effect with a cross subsidy. We could require insurance
companies to surcharge (beyond the actuarially fair level) individuals with traffic tickets and
correspondingly lower their rates for safer drivers. This would work, however, only with
mandatory insurance, since otherwise the less careful drivers would refuse to insure. The
idea of using insurance as an alternative to taxation is discussed in Ronen Avraham & Kyle
P. Logue, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L.
REY. (forthcoming 2003).
44. The labor supply effect exists because in this model, causing accidents amounts to a
luxury good - all things being equal, when a person earns more money, her marginal utility
for money declines. so damages sting less, so she is more able to be careless and have more
fun. Thus, all things being equal, a person with a higher income will find carelessness more
affordable. But if most accidents take place during leisure· hours. there is a countervailing
effect on labor supply, since the utility of leisure declines (through elimination of the fun
leisure activity of careless driving) and the relative attractiveness of labor therefore in
creases. For many luxury goods, we can create the same positive effect on labor supply
through an excise tax. We might obtain a similar "tax" on carelessness to some extent by is
suing expensive traffic tickets. (The excise tax option is discussed in Kaplow & Shavell,
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 40, at 825-26.) But here, relying purely on
traffic tickets would lose the second benefit of the tort surcharge, which is that the payments
are targeted to the least careless individuals. Perhaps, however, we could offer a tax credit to
individuals who had gone through the year without a ticket. The efficiency picture for the
combination of traffic tickets and tax credits is mixed. This combination of measures avoids
the expense of litigating torts cases, and if people are risk-averse but not fully insured, it may
have less of an overdeterrence effect than the tort scheme. On the other hand, the cumula
tive expense of traffic patrols and numerous traffic-court cases might be more than the cost
of litigating a much smaller amount of torts cases, the accuracy of the results might be less,
and we would have to create a system to cross-tabulate income tax returns and traffic rec
ords. In the general case, designing and implementing a tax that duplicates the effects of a
redistributive legal rule may require unrealistic amounts of information about each individ
ual. See RONEN AVRAHAM ET AL., REVISTING THE ROLE OF LEGAL RULES AND TAX
RULES IN INCOME REDISTRIBUTION (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Univ. of Mich ...
Working Paper No. 02-004).
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holds in many situations at least to a first approximation, meaning that
the required redistributive adjustments in legal rules often are small.
Second, it tells us where to look for the exceptional cases in which
substantial legal redistribution is appropriate.45 These occur primarily
when income provides a signal of some underlying quantity that we
want to redistribute, but responses to a legal rule add significant
information beyond the income signal. These are nonobvious conclu
sions, and anyone who is interested in redistribution can benefit from
understanding this economic analysis.46
B.

The Nash Bargaining Solution

Economics may also be able to help us address another equity
problem. Suppose two individuals disagree about how to divide a fund
between them, and an arbitrator is called upon to resolve the dispute.
Assume that we have access to at least some utility information about
the parties. What standard should . the arbitrator use to divide the
money? There are several potential answers, but the one that stands
out is the Nash bargaining solution.
There are several plausible characteristics that we might demand
from a solution. First, the result should be somewhere between the
entitlements of the two parties. After all, the arbitrator is being asked
to divide the amount in dispute, not to seize and reallocate amounts
that clearly belong to one party or the other. Second, changes in
entitlements should only affect the outcome if they are relevant in the
sense that the change makes the newly preferred outcome available
when it previously would have violated one of the parties' entitlement.
Third, the outcome should not depend on how the arbitrator scales the
utilities of the two parties. The reason for this requirement is that the
best the arbitrator can ·hope to do by observing their behavior is to
establish a van Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for each one,
but these functions are unique only up to multiplication. (For this
reason, utilitarianism is not an option here.) Fourth, if the parties have
identical utility functions in the relevant range, they should split the
fund equally, since there is no reason to prefer one party to the other.
Nash proved that these four requirements are compatible only
with a single solution. We obtain that solution as follows: take any
possible division of the disputed amount; calculate the utility gain of
45. Or more accurately, one of the main places to look. It is also possible. for example,
that public choice problems might make it easier to use the courts than the legislature for
redistribution. Certainly, recent rounds of tax legislation have not been an edifying specta
cle.
46. Other important work by tax analysts also uses economic methods to shed light on
the best methods of achieving equity. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Wh y Tax the Rich? Efficiency,
Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 1 391 (2002) (book review) (summarizing
much of the important literature on the subject).
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each party compared with their entitlement level; multiply the two
utility numbers. The bargaining solution is the point which maximizes
this product.47
Besides satisfying these plausible assumptions, the Nash solution
has another substantial strength. There is a good argument that it
represents the outcome that rational bargainers would actually
achieve. Essentially, the Nash solution penalizes the party who is the
most risk averse and has the most to lose from a breakdown in
bargaining, which seems realistic.48 Consider a bargaining situation
where parties with different discount rates exchange offers, knowing
that if their offer is rejected, a bargain will be delayed with consequent
loss of utility. As we make the time between offers smaller and
smaller, the outcome of this bargaining game converges to the Nash
solution.49 Thus, if the parties could conduct their bargaining instantly
and with perfect rationality, they would arrive at something like the
Nash solution. This makes it a plausible outcome for the arbitrator to
pick as fair. Neither party can complain of being cheated of anything
that they would have won in a fair negotiation.50
Neither the axiomatic approach nor the alternating-offer model
provides a knockdown argument for the fairness of the Nash solution.
At best, the Nash solution is fair only if the initial bargaining situation
itself was equitable. The bargaining situation includes the initial
endowments of the parties and their utility curves for the disputed
funds (which might be affected by their incomes). Thus, the Nash
solution is probably not a very useful tool for considering large
questions of distributive justice.51 But in a number of legal situations,
decisionmakers must compare some actual situation with the results of
a hypothetical fair bargain. The Nash solution can help put meat on
the bones of this concept.
A couple of examples may help illustrate the possible applications.
Doctrines such as fraud and duress provide a basis for invalidating a
contract, but in a particular case, abusive bargaining may be too diffi
cult to prove or too subtle to fit these doctrines. One way of gauging
whether the bargaining process malfunctioned is to see whether the
outcome was at least roughly what we would expect from a fair

47. The Nash solution is explained in B RIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 12- 1 7
(1989).
48.

Id.

49.

See

at 23-24.
KEN B INMORE, JUST PLAYING 122-28 (1998).

SO. See BARRY, supra note 47,

at 24-30.

51. See JOHN E. ROEMER, EGALITARIAN PERSPECTIVES: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL
ECONOMICS 202-06 (1 994).
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bargaining process.52 The Nash solution provides no basis for ques
tioning the initial bargaining position and hence cannot be a basis for
redistribution in favor of the weaker party. What it may be able to do,
however, is at least prevent the use of abusive bargaining to redistrib
ute even more wealth toward the party who is already stronger.
Other examples might arise in tax or bankruptcy law, both of
which sometimes require a judgment about whether a contract
between related parties is comparable to an arms-length agreement.53
If the market is fairly thick, it may be possible to make this determina
tion simply by a comparison with market transactions. But where the
market is thin, this may not be possible. Rather than simply relying on
intuition, the Nash solution might give us a gauge for making this
determination.
The biggest question about the Nash solution is not whether it is
the perfect definition of bargaining fairness. There is no reason to
think it is, but we do not need a perfect definition to address practical
legal problems. Rather, the problem is the same as that of welfarism:
Can we get the information needed to apply this technique? Fortu
nately, the Nash solution is not as information intensive as welfarism.
We do not need full interpersonal comparability of utility levels, only
estimates of attitudes toward risk. Moreover, since we are not
purporting to address every issue of social policy, we can avoid situa
tions where utility assignments are especially likely to be idiosyncratic
or difficult to determine. In many situations, the bargaining will
essentially be over money, the most fungible of commodities. Even so,
the Nash solution may be difficult to determine in real-world
situations. Still, it has better prospects for success, albeit in a smaller
sphere, than the more ambitious program of welfarism.
C.

Fair Division Games

Welfarism and the Nash solution both require the analyst to
determine the optimum outcome. An alternative approach is to
concentrate on devising mechanisms that will guide the parties toward
52. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 47-48, 120
(1 993) (suggesting that procedural unfairness may be inferred when contract terms differ
greatly from the norm).
53. In tax law, the best example is provided by § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code,
l.R.C. § 482 (2003), which provides the Treasury with the authority to reallocate income
among related entities in accordance with the true substance of the transaction. For exam
ple, if two related entities transact, § 482 allows the Treasury to redetermine the transaction
in a manner consistent with an arms-length transaction. So, if Distributor (located in the
United States) buys goods from related Manufacturer (located in a lower tax jurisdiction),
and the purchase price is too high (versus comparable arms-length transactions), the IRS can
effectively change the purchase price for tax purposes, increasing Distributor's taxes. The so
called "transfer-pricing agreements" that are frequently entered into by multinationals with
the government are essentially agreements (prior to the transaction) on reasonable prices.
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a fair outcome. The difficulty is that we normally cannot compel full
disclosure of preferences, which the parties have every reason to
conceal. The parties would ideally like to maximize their own shares,
but this is impossible for all of them to achieve. We cannot impose a
solution that maximizes the parties' collective welfare, and they have
no reason to make concessions merely to improve someone else's
welfare. Thus, welfare-maximization is not a realistic goal here. A
more realistic goal is a division that is efficient (so that it could not be
improved by voluntary readjustments) and envy-free (so that no one
would be willing to exchange their own share for anyone else's).
The classic example is the cake-cutting problem. How can
we ensure that two children share a cake equally, when neither is
altruistic and both would prefer as much cake as possible? The
answer, known to parents for generations, is "cut and choose" - one
child cuts the cake in two pieces and the other one chooses. Consider
able ingenuity has been employed in generalizing this procedure. Mat
ters rapidly become more complex when the cake is not homogenous.
For example, most of the decorations might be on one part of the
cake and the children might differ in how much they care for the
decorations versus the cake itself. Further complexities abound as the
number of players increases. In the end, once we leave behind the
simplest situations, the various "multiple moving knives" solutions
become increasingly impractical to implement.54
Nevertheless, there are some promising though imperfect proce
dures for real-world situations. A leading example is the adjusted
winner ("AW") procedure. This procedure applies when two
individuals must divide a finite number of indivisible assets. The two
parties are each given 100 points, which they can divide up among the
objects. The parties then simultaneously announce their allocation of
points to various objects. Each individual is tentatively awarded all of
the objects for which she has the "high bid." One of the individuals
is given the tie-breaking advantage in this part of the procedure.
Generally, this will leave one of the parties with items worth more
points to her than the other's total points. To equalize matters, we
calculate the ratios for each of the "winning" party's items between
the number of points assigned by the winning party and the number of
points assigned by the losing party in round one. Beginning with the
items with the lowest ratio, we start transferring items to the losing
party until both parties have attained an identical point count;
this may require selling a single item and dividing the proceeds, or
otherwise providing proportional ownership of that item.
The result of the AW procedure, assessed in terms of the
announced point valuations, is efficient (the parties have no incentive
54. See STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR D IVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING
TO D ISPUTE RESOLUTION 6-64 (1996).
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to trade), envy free (neither would switch with the other), and equita
ble (the two end up with equal utilities based on their announced
valuations). The only problem with this procedure is that, at least in
theory, a player with enough information about the other party's
preferences can gain an advantage through strategic allocation of
points in the first round. In practice, however, this type of strategic
manipulation appears to be difficult to accomplish; in any event, there
is another procedure called proportional allocation that can be used as
a backup.55
The AW procedure has several possible legal applications. One
obvious application of the adjusted winner procedure is the division of
property in divorce.56 A similar application would involve the division
of personal property in an estate, where sale to an outsider might fail
to capture the items' sentimental value.57 In dissolving a partnership,
the procedure might also be used if some of the partnership assets are
more valuable to firm members than to outsiders, assuming that an
auction did not appear to be a fair solution. Compared to the Nash
solution, the AW procedure seems to have a narrower range of poten
tial applications, but it does have the advantage of being easily
implemented.
CONCLUSION
As we saw in our discussion of welfarism, one of the bigges�
problems in devising equitable solutions is that preferences are privat�
information, which may be very difficult to obtain. As it happens,
however, economists are interested in the general problem of creating
information-revelation mechanisms. There is good reason to hope for
some useful synergy with law, which could result in some useful new
methods for making equitable allocations.
Economics also has other uses in trying to achieve equity. As we
have seen, it provides useful guidance on the choice of redistributive
instruments. Economic analysis also reveals unexpected connections
between different aspects of ethical judgment - revealing, for
example, the connection between utilitarianism, the Pareto principle,
and the ex ante perspective. Posner is almost certainly right about the
limited extent to which economics can contribute to the resolution of
ultimate value conflicts. Kaplow and Shavell's contrary claim is far too

55.

Id.

at 70-78.

56. See Jeremy A. Matz, Note, We 're All Winners: Game Theory, the Adjusted Winner
Procedure, and Property Division at Divorce, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1339 (2001).
57. Another solution would be an auction between the family members, but this would
probably be seen as fair only if they could call upon similar resources in the bidding. Also,
bidding could be distorted by the prospect of recapturing some of the bid when the auction
proceeds are distributed to the beneficiaries.
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ambitious. But this does not mean that economics is limited to point
ing out the range of Pareto-efficient solutions, with nothing at all to
say about how to choose between them.
The conclusion, then, is that economics has a limited but valuable
role to play in helping to make the legal system more equitable.
Economics cannot prove that equity is a valid social goal. But if we do
value equity in the legal system, economics may be able to help us
define it more carefully and pursue it more effectively. It is a mistake
to think that efficiency is the only goal of the legal system that can
benefit from economic analysis. Ironically, despite his reputation as an
aggressive intellectual promoter of law and economics, this is one area
where Judge Posner's claims for economics may be a little too modest.
Posner is surely correct, however, that justice cannot be reduced to
economics.
Welfarism, as propounded by Kaplow and Shaven, is not a viable
alternative. Unless it reduces simply to utilitarianism, welfarism is
generally indeterminate. Outcomes will generally depend on the
choice of a SWF (and sometimes on whether the function is applied ex
post or ex ante). These critical choices - and the constitutional
procedures for making them - must be based on norms other than
welfarism. And, of course, the underlying individual utility functions
are themselves difficult to define. Economics may well contribute
importantly to our understanding of how to implement equity. But
understanding the ultimate meaning of equity is another matter. For
that, we must look outside of economics.
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APPENDIX

For any suitable ranking of outcomes, we wish to construct a
corresponding SWF. The technique can be seen most easily in the two
person case, where every utility state assigns one utility to the first
person (call her Ann) and another to the second (Mary).58 Consider
any finite set of utility states, ordered according to some preference,
UN , . . . U2, U 1 , 0, where 0 is a point that is Pareto-inferior to all of the
others. (For example, if all utilities are positive, 0 can be the origin.)
To ensure that the Pareto principle is respected, we require that none
of these states be Pareto superior to a state that is higher in the
preference ranking. Now, all we have to do is construct our SWF. The
details turn out to be a little complicated, but the process is basically
straightforward.
We construct the SWF as follows. Begin with 0 and assign the
following value to any point X which is Pareto-superior to 0: f (X) 1
- e ·d(o.xi, where d(O, X) is the distance between 0 and X. Note that
f(O) 0, and f(X) rises toward (but never equals) 1 as the distance
between X and 0 increases. (For the rest of the plane, outside of the
set of points that are Pareto-superior to 0, we use any SWF that is
strictly bounded above by 0.) Given any two points that are both
Pareto-superior to 0, if one is Pareto-superior to the other, then it
must be farther away from 0, and hence its f-value will be higher. So
we have created a SWF on the whole plane that ranks 0 at the bottom
of the listed group, since all the other social states on the list are
Pareto-superior to 0. Now all we have to do is repeat the process.
Recall that our initial SWF was designed to have values less than 1.
Now we modify the SWF. We set the f-value of U1 as 1, and for any
point x that is Pareto-superior to ui' we set f(x) 2 - e ·d(UJ ,X). As
before, within the set of points Pareto-superior to U i ' f constitutes a
SWF. Moreover, no point in this new set is Pareto-inferior to any
point outside the set, all of which have f-values below 1. So we now
have a SWF that ranks U1 above 0. We continue the process through
each point on the list through UN. We now have a SWF which produces
the required ranking.59 Of course, given a different ranking of points,
we could produce another SWF to produce that ranking instead.
These SWFs need some tweaking if we want to add some
additional desirable qualities. For example, the SWFs we have defined
so far are not continuous at the edges of the Pareto-superior sets for
=

=

=

58. The generalization to the n-person case is straightforward but more difficult to
visualize.
59. Equivalently, and perhaps more elegantly, we would begin with U, and work our
way back to 0, at each step defining the SWF for all points Pareto-superior to UM but not to
U M,,. This would avoid the need to first assign and then reassign values to some points.
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each of the points Uw To obtain continuity, we need to add a short
ramp at the edge of each Pareto set; if we want to get fancier, we can
curve the edges of the ramp so that the SWF will be differentiable. In
addition, we might also want the SWF to be symmetrical (invariant
under permutations of the coordinates). We would then proceed as
follows: We take each of the listed utility states and pair it with a state
where Ann's utility is at least as high as Mary's, reversing the order of
the coordinates where necessary to achieve this. We carry over the
original rank ordering to these new points. We must again assume that
no point which is higher on the list is Pareto-inferior to a point lower
on the list; otherwise no symmetrical SWF is possible. Now, we repeat
the same procedure used to create a SWF, as laid out in the proceed
ing paragraph, except that we define f(X) only if X is above the diago
nal line x=y. In the next step, for any point Z below the diagonal line,
we match that point with the point X having the same coordinates in
reverse order, and set f(Z) = f(X).
If we want to add convexity on top of these qualities, some further
complications are needed. To also obtain convexity, we first need a
further restriction on the points. For any point U on the list, consider
the line between U and its mirror image U', which divides the plane in
half. No point lower on the list than U can be in the upper side of this
line and no point higher on the list can be on the lower side of the line.
Second, we need to include everything Pareto-superior (north or west)
of this line in the relevant set when we assign the f-values, rather than
simply using the set of points Pareto-superior to U. Third, instead of
using d(U, X) in the formula, we need to replace U with V, the point
where the line segment between U and U' crosses the x=y diagonal.

